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South Africa has reached the threshold of a new era. Apartheid,'
South Africa's sophisticated political and economic social system based
on racial discrimination shows signs of withering away. President F.W.
de Klerk's pledge to eradicate racial discrimination and to dismantle
apartheid represents a significant departure from the ideology of the
controlling white minority.2 He articulates in spirited aphorisms what
the majority of white South Africans do not want to hear or admit. Yet
in spite of the thorny path lying ahead, the realization of a negotiated
settlement and the dismantling of the apartheid system in South Africa
is discernible. A post-apartheid era requires a post-apartheid constitu-
tion, and any such constitution is incomplete without a bill of rights.3
* Director of the Human Rights Association in Johannesburg, South Africa. Pro-
fessor of Law, Wayne State University. LL.B (Honors), LL.M (London), LL.M.
(Wayne State University) of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-At-Law. Holder of Martin Luther
King, Jr. Fellowship Award.
1. See generally L. THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA (1990) (tracing the
processes that shaped modern South Africa from pre-colonial history through the pre-
sent). The term "apartheid" was coined in the 1930s by Afrikaner intellectuals to de-
scribe the requirement that urban African migrant workers should not be accompanied
by their families. Id. at 186. The term "apartheid" has since come to represent the
institutionalization, through laws and executive action, of the separation of South Af-
rica into four racial groups: Colored, Indian, African, and White. Id. at 190-91. The
system provides for absolute control over the nation by the Whites. Id. The rise of the
system of institutionalized apartheid dates back to the early 1940s. Id. at 187-220. See
also R. OMoND, THE APARTHEID HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO SoUmT AFRICA's EvERY-
DAY RACIAL POLICIES (1985) (reviewing the apartheid system of racial discrimination
in South Africa); Van Zyl Slabbert, From Domination to Democracy, 9 LEADER.sHI
66 (1990) (examining the dominant economic power and privileges of the white South
African minority) [hereinafter Van Zyl Slabbert].
2. See Jozana, The Detroit News, Jan. 14, 1990, at 15A.
3. Imperfect Blueprint, The Daily Telegraph, Sept. 5, 1991 at 16. See generally
Law Reform in Action: Formulating a Bill of Rights for South Africa, 30 CODICILLUS
4-83 (1989) [hereinafter Law Reform] (offering a collection of essays on a South Afri-
can bill of rights); Human Rights in Post-Apartheid South African Constitution, 21
COLUM HUM. Rrs. L. REv. (1989) (presenting papers from human rights lawyers, ex-
perts, and academicians) [hereinafter COLUM. HuMt. RTs. L. REv.]. See also The Rec-
ord of Constitutions in Africa: Some Lessons For A Post-Apartheid South Africa 7
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The idea of sharing political power with blacks has left many white
South African supremacists unmoved or hardened, while leaving white
liberals bewildered.' The Conservative Party which is presently the
main opposition party in the all-white parliament,' has persistently ac-
cused President de Klerk of acquiescing to a "black power communist
dictatorship."'8 A deeply divided white political leadership compounds
de Klerk's difficult position.7 In addition, de Klerk's willingness to start
negotiations with the African National Congress (ANC)8 has left him
open to the caprice and malevolence of the white South African ex-
tremists.9 Some of these extremists have vowed to do anything to cir-
cumvent the negotiation process for a democratic post-apartheid
constitution.' °
In contrast, many blacks welcome de Klerk's proposals to dismantle
the apartheid system." A vast majority of the black population, though
not the entire community, has accepted the idea of involving black rep-
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 224-44 (1990) (discussing the creation of a constitution
and the future of South Africa).
4. Sparks, White Liberals Divided by S. African Shifts; Democrats Weigh Alliance
With ANC, Links With Ruling Party or Go-It-Alone Stand, Wash. Post, Sept. 11,
1990, at A14. See Law Reform, supra note 3, at 9 (noting the precarious position of
white liberals in South African society).
Many blacks believe that even within the so called white progressive and liberal
community, "there are many people" (sic) who, although not openly admitting it,
feel protected by the present political dispensation, and so would be adverse to
any change that tended to guarantee the rights of blacks or even remotely
threatened to rock the boat. This belief is based, among others, on the shift to
the right in national elections whenever some presence is being brought to bear
on South Africa, either internally or externally.
Id.
5. South Africa's Right Wing Threat, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 16,
1990, at 52.
6. Maclean, South Africa Spells Out Minority Rights Plan Ahead of ANC Talks,
Reuter Library Report, May 13, 1990.
7. See de Klerk, Return of the Nats, 9 LEADERSHIP 51-54 (1990) (providing an
interesting account of the political divisions within the white South African
community).
8. See H.W. VAN DER MERWE, PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
157-74 (1987) (examining the prospects for negotiation in South Africa among the
various political groups). According to the author, there are three basic reasons why
the South African government has not made much progress in negotiating, even though
there is an underlying willingness among the various groups: (1) the conflicting ideolo-
gies and divergent considerations within the white government; (2) the continuation of
political violence by the government and opposition groups; (3) the fear of communism
and the communist connections of the African National Congress. Id. See also A.
LEMON, APARTHEID IN TRANSITION 351-55 (1987) (detailing the history of the African
National Congress).
9. Wren, Rumblings on the Right, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1990, at 32.
10. Clough, South Africa: A Land Losing Hope, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 10,
1990, at Dl.
11. Mbeki, Disarming Talk, 9 LEADERSHIP 24 (1990).
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resentatives in the negotiation process.12 Some blacks strongly feel that
de Klerk is a crafty and calculating politician who is faking liberalism
to disguise his true motives, and that his anti-apartheid speeches and
purported willingness to negotiate with the ANC are cynical, hypocriti-
cal, and a meaningless public relations exercise.13 Others argue that de
Klerk desperately needs the support of accredited black leaders like
Nelson Mandela and Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi for the sal-
vation of his reform program.1 4 Despite the fears and skepticisms, most
black South Africans are united in the belief that de Klerk deserves the
chance to honor his negotiation promise."
There are still genuine fears as to whether the South African politi-
cal climate is ready for proper negotiations to take place without hin-
derance. Nelson Mandela has succeeded in convincing the majority of
South Africans to support the ANC in the negotiation process; 6 but de
Klerk has lost some support for reform among the white minority.17
Despite the rise in activities of extremist white vigilante groups that
harass blacks and white opponents of apartheid,18 the progress toward
dismantling the system of apartheid is irreversible. Mandela and de
Klerk's eagerness to negotiate stems from an authoritative mandate re-
ceived from their respective popular organizations, although there has
been no serious debate or indication of any possible agreement concern-
ing the structure and form of a post-apartheid constitution. There is,
however, a general consensus regarding the need for the inclusion of a
12. Ottaway, South Africans Begin to See Each Other in New Light, Talks Be-
tween Government, ANC Left Former Enemies with Revised Perceptions, Washington
Post, May 8, 1990, at A34.
13. Id.
14. See generally G. MARE & G. HAMILTON, AN APPETITE FOR POWER:
BUTHELEzI'S INKATHA AND SOUTH AFRICA (1987) (examining Chief Buthelezi's role
in South African politics) [hereinafter MARE & HAMILTON]; A. LEMON, APARTHEID IN
TRANSITION 351-55 (1987) (discussing Chief Buthelezi's rise to power). Zulu king
formed Inkatha yeNkululeko yeSisme, the "National Cultural Liberation Movement,"
in 1928. Id. at 330. Chief Buthlelzi revived and reshaped the movement into a politi-
cally-oriented mobilization organization with over one million blacks of Zulu origin. Id.
See also 0. TAMtO, OLIVER TAMBO SPEAKS: PREPARING FOR POWER (1988) (discuss-
ing the ANC's role in the appointment of Chief Buthelezi as Chief Minister of Kwa-
Zulu and the recreation of Inkatha).
15. But see MARE & HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 135-79 (focusing on the rela-
tionship between Inkatha and the ANC).
16. See Van Zyl Slabbert, supra note 1, at 70-74 (discussing the ANC's position
on proposed reforms in South Africa).
17. See Interview with Koos van der Merwe, reprinted in Window on the Right, 9
LEADERSHIP 79 (1990) (interviewing Mr. van der Merwe who assesses the rise of white
South African nationalism and predicts increasing white resistance to reform).
18. See The Wind Rises in Welkom, TIME, May 28, 1990, at 37 (examining the
actions of South African white extremists).
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bill of rights in any constitution."9 It is absolutely impossible to guaran-
tee protection of all human rights, however, without distinguishing be-
tween rights which are fundamental and those which are incidental or
concurrent.20
Both de Klerk's National Party (NP)2' and the ANC have prepared
and published some weighty documents which spell out how each or-
ganization proposes to protect human rights under a new democratic
institution." This article analyzes these documents and examines,
strictly from a human rights lawyer's perspective, whether the proposed
Bill of Rights will lead to equality or neo-apartheid.
This article discusses the extent to which human rights will be pro-
moted and protected under the envisaged South African Constitution
and Bill of Rights. In addition, it endeavors to establish what norms of
human rights are considered necessary to preserve and protect in a bill
of rights, and the criterion used to make that determination. Finally,
the article addresses the prospect of settlement negotiations to give the
black majority full equality without suppressing the individual free-
doms and fundamental rights of some ethnic groups, including the
white minority.
There are immense problems facing all parties to the negotiations. 3
Mandela's fortitude coupled with his sense of forgiveness and pragma-
tism have won him a great deal of support and admiration all over the
world. Nevertheless, harsh opposition from conservative and extremist
groups, who demand a referendum among the white population on the
issue of negotiating with the black majority, may affect de Klerk's
mandate.24
President de Klerk must, however, forge ahead with his mandate to
negotiate with the ANC and other accredited leaders. Other countries
19. See Breytenbach, Dreams of Hope, 9 LEADERSHIP 86 (1990) (arguing that the
real problems lay beyond the dismantling of the apartheid system, and stating that the
South Africans must outline a procedural framework to deal with these problems).
20. See infra notes 177-87 and accompanying text (discussing the inclusion of fun-
damental rights and other concurrent rights in the proposed South African Bill of
Rights).
21. See ADAM & MOODLEY, supra note 5, at 58-76 (providing a general descrip-
tion of the National Party and the other white political parties).
22. See 21 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv., supra note 3, at 241-48 (reproducing the
"South African Law Commission Bill of Rights" issued by the South African govern-
ment's Commission consisting of judges, attorneys, government officials, and academi-
cians). See also id. at 235-39, 249-51 (reproducing the ANC's "Freedom Charter" and
the ANC's Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa).
23. See supra notes 5-18, and accompanying text (presenting the main political
and ideological groups participating in the reform negotiations in South Africa).
24. See Waldner, Talk of War, 9 LEADERSHIP 78 (1990) (observing the hostility of
white extremists toward changes in the apartheid system).
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have experienced the same or similar problems concerning the issue of
equality. South Africa can learn from the experiences of other states in
resolving these problems under international and municipal law.
I. EQUALITY AND CHANGE
Throughout the history of social and political development, colossal
empires and powerful regimes have collapsed under the mighty tides of
freedom and the crescendo of clamors for justice, liberty, and equal-
ity.25 Social transformation is an irreversible process, and those who
still want to embrace and preserve the system of apartheid ignore the
laws of social dynamics. To avoid a blood bath which has characterized
most struggles for freedom and independence, all South Africans
should seize this opportunity and support the negotiation process for a
constitutional settlement.
Racism is a special form of oppression, in the sense that it primarily
considers the victim as inherently inferior and the oppressor as a right-
eous saint called upon to fulfill a "divine" role of disempowerment and
denigration.26 Where blacks are the victims of oppression, whites bene-
fit regardless of class, status, or gender. Indeed, the white working class
in South Africa vehemently supports apartheid. 7
The injustices and inhumane social conditions under which people
live generate the demand for equality. The concept of equality harks
back to the classic Stoic notions of democracy,28 the English liberal
tradition of Hobbes and Locke, 29 and the French social philosophy
taught by Voltaire and Rousseau."0 Gerhard Liebholz, an early scholar
defined equality and the law's involvement in promoting and protecting
equal rights in a democracy:
Modem democracy is characterized by the generalization of the idea of equality.
This process seems to represent some sort of historic necessity, but it also shows
the inherent tendency of the equality notions to radicalize itself. And the basis of
25. Examples are the ancient Roman Empire, the colonial British Empire, the Nazi
regime of Adolph Hitler, and other fascist and racist regimes which also collapsed. All
of these authorities used law to entrench their powers and to silence and subjugate
their opponents. More recently, dictatorial regimes collapsed in the disintegration of
communism in Eastern Europe.
26. See THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 187-220 (discussing the beliefs that led to the
creation of the apartheid system in South Africa).
27. Battersby, Botha's Party Loses Ground in Segregated Local Voting, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 28, 1988, at A6.
28. Koupmans, Comparative Analysis and Evaluation, in CONSTITUTIONAL PRO-
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this evolution consists of the abstract and general orientation of the concept
itself."
Equality constitutes a demand for equal opportunities in law, govern-
ment, education, employment, housing, and social welfare. In the South
African context, the law's role to promote change depends upon one's
perception of the law as an isolated system or flexible social instrument.
If one views the law as a flexible social instrument that constantly
changes and develops, then the theory of social transformation is a
prognosis for a new social order in which the law has an important role
facilitating legal changes.
The creation of human rights protections has played a key role in
this new social order. Human rights protection continues to be of cen-
tral significance in the development of nations and promotion of equal-
ity among people. The notion of human rights depicts a political con-
sciousness and social commitment toward the protection of individual
rights.
In South Africa, the demand for political freedom and respect for
basic human rights is implicit in the debate regarding the Bill of
Rights. Post-apartheid South Africa cannot afford to suddenly guaran-
tee all human rights to South Africans without causing some discon-
tentment. The ANC may function as a source of liberation for the
black South African majority, but it would be naive to think that once
the government institutes a constitution, black South Africans will sud-
denly have decent jobs, better pay, adequate housing, access to a good
education, and social security. Governments should guarantee and pro-
tect human rights based upon the indispensability and necessity of such
rights. A right is indispensable when its quality is innate. Recognition
of this quality should dictate the priority of human rights which gov-
ernments should protect.
The unequivocal proclamation of some rights as inalienable and im-
prescriptible goes back to the ancient teachings of Aquinas.3 2 Inaliena-
ble rights have their origin in natural law, and are often referred to as
natural rights. 3 Natural law holds that positive law cannot take away
any right given to man by nature or divine power without good reason-
able course. 4 The Declaration of the Rights of Man enacted by the
31. Id.
32. See Kamenka, The Anatomy of an Idea, in HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (1978) (present-
ing the background of scholarly discourse on the conception of rights).
33. K. Minogue, The History of the Idea of Human Rights, HUM. RTS. READER 3-
16 (1990).
34. See Locke, Second Treatise of Government, reprinted in J. LOCKE Two TREA-
TISES OF GOVERNMENT (Dent ed. 1975); DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW,
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French in 1789 was an establishment of a Bill of Rights after the col-
lapse of a repressive feudalist system, which promoted equality and re-
spect for fundamental freedoms and individual liberties.30
Critics of natural law are likely to be law and order proponents who
adhere to the supremacy of positive law.36 Karl Marx warned about the
danger of putting emphasis on the individual aspect of natural rights to
the extent that no consideration was given to the class or collective out-
look of these rights in relation to the dynamics of class conflicts and
social transformation."7 What really matters is not whether these are
individual or collective rights, but the fact that they are all inalienable
rights. The ideology of natural law and natural rights transcends the
limits of moral philosophy to embrace political and social issues like the
right of self determination, the right to vote, the right to unionize, and
the right to strike. In sum, the South African Bill of Rights will have to
give priority to those rights which are considered to be fundamental by
virtue of their social necessity.
II. THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LAW
A. INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The notion of equality and international commitment to the promo-
tion and protection of human rights existed before the creation of the
United Nations 8 and the subsequent pronouncement of the Universal
reprinted in 38 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1-320 (T. Nugent trans.
1977); J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL RoUssEAu
1-124 (L. Blair trans. 1974); J.S. MILL, ESSAY ON LIBERTY (1859); I. KANT, ON THE
RELATIONSHIP OF THEORY TO PRACTICE IN POLITICAL RIGHT (1792). Rights which
are generally proclaimed as natural rights are inter alia, the right to life, the right to
property, the right to liberty, freedom of speech, and freedom of association. The right
to life is the most important one due to the fact that the enjoyment of all the other
rights is actually dependent on being alive. Accordingly, no person or government
should take lives or connive in the taking of lives or allow others to take lives without
good reason. Derogation from this rule may be considered in cases pertaining to capital
punishment or in exceptional instances involving abortion.
35. See J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL Rous-
SEAU 1-124 (L. Bair trans. 1974)) (teaching that human society is the basis of morality
and that moral rights stem from society's demand not to injure one's neighbor).
36. See Williams, At the Gates of Freedom, Wash. Post, Apr. 8, 1990, at 16 (iden-
tifying South African racism as unique).
37. Vassilyev, Equality and Social Progress: Legal Aspects in 3 EQUAUTY AND
FREEDOM 953-57 (G. Dorsey ed. 1977).
38. See generally F. ADCOCK & J. MOSLEY, DIPLOMACY IN ANCIENT GREECE
(1975) (noting that the role of customary international law relating to the protection of
human rights in ancient Egypt and Greece existed long before the United Nations).
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Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations General Assem-
bly in 1948. 39 The first positive evidence of international law involve-
ment in the protection of human rights was in the area of customary
international law.40 The first situations concerned the establishment of
treaties to resolve international disputes. 41 During the 17th century the
works of eminent scholars such as Hugo Grotius advanced the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention."' Grotius viewed humanitarian interven-
tion as the lawful use of force against a state which mistreasts its own
nationals.43 Some powerful states, however, have used the doctrine as a
pretext to invade weaker nations, establishing political influence and
hegemony." In spite of this abuse, the doctrine remains an appropriate
method for the protection of human rights.
In the beginning, the defense and preservation of human rights was
hindered by the belief that only states could be subjects of international
law. Individuals were regarded as objects of international law, therefore
they had no standing in an international court or tribunal (dualist the-
ory). 45 This seriously affected the right of an individual to enforce his
or her right in international law.46 In addition, under the principle of
non-interference in the national affairs of another independent state,
humanitarian intervention may violate the sovereign integrity of an-
other independent state.47
The concept of human rights resembles a universal and comprehen-
sive concourse of distinct and palpable rights.48 These may be individ-
39. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/
810 (1948) (noting that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a reflection of
natural rights at a later stage of social and political development).
40. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 16-40 (6th ed. 1963) (identifying natu-
ral law and custom as sources of international human rights law)[hereinafter
BRIERLY].
41. A. BLAUSTEIN, R. CLARK & J. SIEGLER, HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 1-219
(1987) [hereinafter, BLAUSTEIN] (detailing United Nations documents addressing
human rights); C. MACARTNEY, NATIONAL STATES AND NATIONAL MINORITIES (1934)
(suggesting that while nation-states defined by territory are a modern phenomenon,
states of nationalities have existed since the creation of societies).
42. See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 312 & n.3 (Lauterpacht 8th ed.
1955); E. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 56-7 (1921); H. LAUTER-
PACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 117-18 (1950) (stating that Grotius
and other commentators supported humanitarian intervention in cases where states de-
nied fundamental human rights to its nationals).
43. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 42, at 117-18.
44. J. MOORE, LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217 (1974).
45. L. HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 137-227 (2d ed.
1987).
46. Id. at 140-41.
47. Id. at 106-07.
48. See Driscoll, The Development of Human Rights in International Law, HUM.
RTs. READER 41 (1990).
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ual rights or collective rights. Individual rights are rights which belong
to persons on an individual basis; and collective rights are rights which
persons acquire as a group, minority, or nation."" The right of self-
determination entitles a nation or people (people's right) to political
independence and to freely choose its own government; and collective
rights entail the right of a group or minority to enjoy the same free-
doms and liberties without suffering discrimination at the hands of the
majority.50
International protection of human rights and development of interna-
tional human rights law only began to seriously attract the attention of
the international community after the Nazi government in Germany
committed the genocide of Jews and other minorities during World
War II1 Determined never to see this tragic episode happen again, the
superpowers and their allies agreed to establish an international institu-
tion for the purposes of promoting international peace and security. As
a result, the United Nations was founded on June 26, 1945.12 Although
initially it concentrated on human rights in Europe, the new indepen-
dent nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America brought to the United
Nations General Assembly's attention the peculiar problems of
decolonization and neo-colonialism.5 3
The United Nations Charter contains provisions for the protection of
human rights. Articles 1, 13, and 55 of the Charter specifically include
references to the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms
49. Cranston, Are There Any Human Rights?, 112 DAEDALUS 10 (1983).
50. See BRIERLY, supra note 40, at 23 (noting the significance of human rights law
and its affinity with national law).
... the law of nature stands for the existence of purpose in law, reminding us
that law is not a meaningless set of arbitrary principles to be mechanically ap-
plied by the courts, but that it exists for certain ends, though those ends may
have to be differently formulated in different times and places.
Id.
51. L. HENKIN, supra note 45, at 981-82. The League of Nations, the predecessor
of the United Nations, formed in 1919 as part of the World War I Peace Settlement,
was the first international organization to be entrusted with the duty of promoting the
rights of European minorities. Id. However, the League of Nations lacked the power
and credibility which was required for its success, faded away and was replaced by the
United Nations. Id. The United Nations Charter fully guarantees the protection of the
rights of minorities, this also involves their right to self determination. See Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514,
U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.N.Y.B. 49 (reaffirming the General
Assembly's faith in the fundamental human rights proclaimed in the United Nations
Charter).
52. Starke, Human Rights and International Law, HutAN RiGHrs 113 (Kamenka
ed. 1978).
53. See id. at 122-23 (enumerating the scope of United Nations human rights reso-
lutions during the 1950s and 1960s).
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for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 4 Arti-
cle 2 promotes respect for the principle of equal rights and self-deter-
mination in respect of all peoples.55 Article 55 further guarantees a
high standard of living, and economic and social development.0
The United Nations has the ability to apply economic sanctions or
even military force against a delinquent member-state, 57 and such a
decision binds all member-states.5 8 Sanctions accelerated the downfall
of Ian Smith's regime in Rhodesia, 59 and are now playing a very signif-
icant role in expediting the eradication of apartheid in South Africa." °
The question remains whether an independent South Africa can afford
to promote and guarantee all the human rights contained in the Char-
ter, including guarantees of economic and social progress.
Other United Nations resolutions, however, may assist in forcing
compliance of human rights in countries like South Africa. The United
Nations created the "International Bill of Rights""1 not to proclaim
itself as an agency that formulated or enforced international law, but to
represent the wishes of the international community for the accom-
plishment of peace, international cooperation, and respect for human
rights and dignity.
The United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948 and the two 1966 covenants, which jointly form the "Interna-
tional Bill of Rights", represented an international proclamation of
general human rights. Thirty-five member-states ratified the covenants,
which came into force in 1976.62 The member-states provided proce-
dures with noticeable differences for each of the two covenants. The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supplemented by
54. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 1, 13, 55.
55. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2.
56. U.N. CHARTER, art. 55.
57. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 39-43. The Security Council, entrusted with the mainte-
nance of international peace and security, may invoke measures to maintain or restore
international peace and security if it is convinced that there is a breach of the peace or
act of aggression. U.N. CHARTER, art. 39. These measures include complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and severance of diplomatic relations. U.N. CHAR-
TER, arts. 41-43.
58. See H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 706-65 (1964)(surveying
the use of sanctions by the United Nations against its member-states).
59. Moffet, The Security Council and the Use of Force, 3 J. INT'L AFFAIRS 80-130
(1989).
60. Id. at 92.
61. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, (III), U.N. Doc. A/
810 (1948); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights].
62. See supra note 61 (citing the International Bill of Rights).
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the Optional Protocol,63 has a special body (Human Rights Commis-
sion) which considers complaints of human rights violations, and must
report to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. In
contrast, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights has no commission required to promote its enforcement. In-
stead, state parties are expected to submit progress reports to the Eco-
nomic and Social Council.6
Legislators may resort to the International Bill of Rights to create a
future South African Bill of Rights. Community relations legislation
aimed at eliminating discrimination may also benefit from the cove-
nants. The main weakness, however, of these human rights covenants
(and that of international law as a whole) is the inability of enforce-
ment. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the organ of the
United Nations responsible for adjudication of international disputes, is
only authorized under article 59 of the United Nations Charter to
make decisions binding on the parties involved in the dispute. Interna-
tional treaties, however, become enforceable once ratified by member-
states.6  The status of resolutions and declarations is completely differ-
ent. Article 13 of the United Nations Charter grants to member-states
the power to approve resolutions and any recommendations contained
therein. 7 Declarations are statements of intent which, though not le-
gally binding, are universally accepted as general principles of law.6 8
The proposed South African Bill of Rights represents the views of
the ANC and the government on the issues of constitutionalism and
human rights within the framework of a negotiated settlement and a
post-apartheid democracy. Professor Thomashausen reminds us that:
Declarations, charters or other legal instruments purporting to legally protect
and enforce human or fundamental and political rights have one difficulty in
common: That of defining (i) the scope or the reach of any particular human or
fundamental right, and (ii) the permissible limitations of or encroachment upon
such a right in the individual case or under specific circumstance.0,
63. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G. A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
64. See The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
supra note 61 (regarding United Nations effects to eliminate racial discrimination).
See also G.A. Res. 3151 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 33, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1973) (regarding United Nations condemnation of apartheid).
65. U.N. CHARTER, art. 59.
66. HENKIN, supra note 45, at 4.
67. U.N. CHARTER, art. 12.
68. Article 38 1.c of the new Charter; B.AusrEIN, supra note 41, at 3-7.
69. Thomashausen, Savings Clauses and the Meaning of the Phrase "Acceptable
in a Democratic Society" - A Comparative Study, 30 CODICILLUS 56 (1989).
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To achieve peace in the area of human rights, states apply other
methods which can be equally important for a post-apartheid South
Africa. Regional institutions such as The Council of Europe, the Or-
ganization of American States (OAS), and the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) have implemented these methods with success. The most
successful regional instrument is the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Con-
vention) signed by the member-states of the Council of Europe in No-
vember, 1950.70 The European Convention assigned the task of
investigating human rights violations in the European region to the Eu-
ropean Commission of Human Rights. 71 The European Convention also
established a European Court of Human Rights with compulsory juris-
diction over all human rights issues and complaints involving European
governments. 72 An individual complainant must first exhaust all availa-
ble domestic remedies before he or she can file a complaint with the
Commission. 3
The OAU does not provide for an African Court of Human Rights.
Instead, it has a Human Rights Commission without any enforcement
power." The Human Rights Commission's refusal to grant member-
ship to states ruled by white minority governments reveals its concern
with racism. Still, it turns a blind eye on the admission of oppressive
ethnic minority governments and states which have horrendous records
of human rights violations. In contrast to the OAU and OAS, the
Council of Europe restricts membership to states which have a good
record of respect and honor for human rights and democracy28 It was
this restriction which delayed the admission of Greece, and caused the
Council to bar the admission of Spain and Portugal until both countries
had established democratic governments.78
The Council of Europe is principally concerned with civil liberties,
and social and cultural rights. In contrast, the OAU emphasizes politi-
cal rights, and is the first regional authority to stress the importance of
peoples' rights and the need to promote the right of self-
determination.77
70. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1950) [hereinafter European Convention].
71. Id. at art. 19(1).
72. Id.
73. Id. at art. 26.
74. Id. at arts. 30-31.
75. Id. at art. 3.
76. T. BUERGENTHAL & H. MAIER, BASIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (1985).
77. See The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, art. 19, O.A.U CAB/
LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982). See also Omuzurike, Interna-
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1. South Africa's Post-Apartheid Role in the Promotion of Federal-
ism and the OAU
A democratic South Africa will have a significant role to play in the
advancement of equality in Africa through the OAU. Problems of
ethnicity and secession continue to bedevil the OAU and frustrate its
efforts toward the realization of African unity. This dilemma is com-
pounded by the fact that federalism in Africa has not had enough time
to gain ground and neutralize ethnic hostilities and other related con-
flicts. Accordingly, it is completely unfair to write off the federal con-
stitutional model in Africa just on the basis of the existing ethnic
conflicts.
Africa, like any other continent, is dynamic and not static. Most of
the political tensions facing the African continent at present stem from
the ugly legacy of the colonial divide-and-rule policy. Africa's political
progress is to some extent hampered by the eurocentric sense of judg-
ment. Africans should choose their own destiny according to their own
heritage and concrete historical experiences.
The legacy of colonialism, for instance, has imposed serious ethnic
frictions in Nigeria. Some minorities and ethnic groups in Nigeria con-
veniently use regional autonomy platforms as rallying cries for separa-
tism and secession. The creation of new states and building of new
schools, technical colleges, and universities for each state, has in spite
of all the set backs, helped in the promotion of national unity and ad-
vancement of educational and employment opportunities in Nigeria.78
Thus, the spirit of federalism in Nigeria and Africa as a whole is still
very much alive. A federal constitution is the best alternative left for
the promotion of national unity and equal opportunity. Yet, the
proliferation of secessionist trends within federal unions today, bears
abundant evidence of a sad gravitation away from federalism. There
can be no national unity without patriotism, and the answer to dispar-
ity lies not in vindictiveness or abdication, but in national tolerance and
cooperation.
Likewise, it is injudicious for some South African academicians71 to
cultivate the notion that an independent South Africa should be instru-
mental towards the establishment of an independent "regional" human
tional Law and Colonialism in Africa, ZAMBIA L.J. (1971-72) (discussing self-determi-
nation and colonialism).
78. Raudal, Bouyed by Oil, Rags-to-Riches Nigeria Fends Off Disaster, Wash.
Post, Feb 27, 1977, at A13.
79. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (citing the opinions of Professors
Naidu and Ndaki).
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rights organization in Southern Africa, notwithstanding that the OAU
still remains the only recognized and accredited regional authority in
the world and the African continent. Nobody would disagree if such an
idea canvasses the creation of a Southern African Economic Union
based on the same or similar views and objectives as the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) and Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS). Professor Ndaki writes:
One of the positive consequences of a bill of rights is that South Africa could
then be the catalyst for the initiation of a Southern African convention on
human rights and fundamental freedoms similar to the European conventions.
This would then ensure the protection of human rights of all people in this part
of Africa. Such a Southern African regional convention would affiliate with the
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. 80
Regionalism in international law is defined in terms of continental
areas, thus the European Convention involves European states, the
OAS involves American states, and the OAU involves African states.
South Africa is part of the African continent, and it will therefore be
imprudent to create a sub-regional human rights organization while
still claiming membership to the OAU. Further, Ndaki's treatment of
South African homeland authorities as "regional states" within the
context of regional protection of human rights, creates the false impres-
sion that the homeland governments are recognized in international
law. 8'
2. Individual v. Group Rights
From historical and modern perspectives, the struggle for equality in
South Africa is a struggle about human rights and self-determination.
In essence, equality is a rejection of domination by one group, and a
demand that the government should be a true picture of fair represen-
tation and a symbol of national unity, composed of all the racial and
minority segments of society. South Africa's struggle is therefore not
just a crusade against apartheid or racial discrimination, but a struggle
for self-determination and national unity.
The intriguing question is how a post-apartheid South Africa deals
with national unity and the issue of individual and group rights. The
extirpation of apartheid is chiefly designed to redress the historically
indigent and disadvantaged black majority. The concept of equality
80. See Ndaki, Human Rights - The Regional Dimension, 30 CODICILLUs 29
(1989) (citing Naidu, The Right to Freedom of Thought and Religion and to Freedom
of Expression and Opinion 1987, in OBITER 73).
81. Id. at 24-25.
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and protection of human rights should therefore be reflected in a legal
system which provides immediate redress and justice to the historically
disadvantaged groups, while also creating a new democratic order
which is characterized by respect for individual freedoms and group
rights.
The question frequently asked is whether the black majority will be
prepared to guarantee all freedoms to a white minority in an indepen-
dent South Africa. The ANC has stated that it is prepared to respect
minority rights,8 but it remains to be seen whether that will be possi-
ble under the present ANC's Freedom Charter and Constitutional
Guidelines.83 It may be strange that black South Africans are preoccu-
pied with the protection of the rights of a white minority in a post-
apartheid South Africa, while white South Africans have never been
really interested in the rights of blacks as an indigenous majority.
When former white colonies like Zimbabwe were about to become
independent, similar fears about the rights of the white minority set-
tlers were raised. 4 It is not surprising at all, that in the whole history
of human and race relations, there has never been any complaint or
cause to believe that a white minority was oppressed or discriminated
against by a black majority. On the contrary, white-dominated regimes
have historically subjugated and oppressed black indigenous peoples
through colonialism and enslavement.
A post-apartheid South Africa will have to accord to the white mi-
nority some protection as individuals and as a group; not on the basis of
color, but as South Africans. The same applies to all the various ethnic
groups or minorities wishing to retain their religious or cultural heri-
tage, including the rights of women and children. As indicated earlier,
modern federalism offers the best chance of success for South African
democracy.
Federalism should not be viewed as separatism or license to create
political divergence where each level of government has autonomous
power which may well be misused. Modern federalism is about interac-
tion between various groups; coordination between central government
and regional bodies; and sharing of national resources for the benefit of
the national state and for the advancement of every individual and
group at all levels of government. Its goals are socio-legal rather than
predominantly political.
82. See Interview with Thabo Mbeki, 9 LEADERSHIP 24 (1990)(presenting the
views of Thabo Mbeki, director of international relations for the ANC).
83. See 21 COLUM. Hubs. R-rs. L. REv., supra note 3, at 235 (discussing the "Free-
dom Charter" and visions of a democratic post-apartheid South Africa).
84. Zimbabwe, Progress, THE EcoN oMIsT, Sept. 29, 1977, at 65.
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South Africa's great national achievement would be the creation of a
common South African citizenship for a multiracial, multicultural,
multilingual, and multireligious nation. The emphasis on individual
rights at the expense of group rights or conversely the stress on group
rights which may encourage separatism, may frustrate the realization
of that goal. South Africa should resist becoming a "melting pot" like
the United States, and reject the assimilation of other cultures into a
dominant state culture as in the Soviet Union. In addition, it should
repudiate the promotion of other nationalisms within one nationalism
as in Canada. The idea is to accept and protect rights not because they
are individual or group rights, but because they are fundamental rights.
South Africa should base its approach to national identity and rights
issues upon the slogan of "one nation with different peoples;" different
not in a national sense, but in racial or cultural terms. Before examin-
ing the provisions of the envisaged Bill of Rights in South Africa, how-
ever, it will help to look at how some other countries have tackled the
enigmas generated by centuries of discrimination and inequality.
B. PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER OTHER STATE'S
CONSTITUTIONS
Many new member-states of the United Nations, regardless of ideo-
logical differences and constitutional models, are now emulating the
common European tradition of proclaiming the protection of funda-
mental freedoms and individual rights. It is momentous to remember,
however, that notable constitutional documents like the English Magna
Carta,85 Petition of Rights,88 Habeas Corpus,8" and the Bill of Rights,88
did nothing to deter the British from oppressing and dehumanizing peo-
ple of color during the epoch of colonialism. Similarly, the American
Declaration of Independence, which proclaimed "all men to be equal"
and to possess "inalienable rights to life, liberty, and pursuit of happi-
85. See Magna Carta, arts. 16-17 (1215) (describing basic human rights); HuM.
RTs. READER 105.
86. Id. The Petition of Rights was a classical British document which expressed the
feelings of the British about justice and the struggle against absolutism and autocracy.
87. Habeas Corpus Act (1679). Habeas Corpus is a traditional English law writ
issued by a judge requiring an imprisoned person to be brought to court in person so
that the reason for his detention or imprisonment can be determined. Habeas Corpus
Act (1679).
88. HUM. R"-s. READER 104-05. The English Bill of Rights was passed in 1689
during the reign of Prince Orange to guarantee freedom of worship and liberties after
the abdication of the late King James IH. The English Bill of Rights (1689); Hum. RTS.
READER 104-105.
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ness" did not protect the blacks who were legally kept in bondage until
the Civil War. 9
Regarding constitutional safeguards, many countries ranging from
the popular western democracies to the acclaimed socialist republics
ostentatiously express constitutional commitment to the promotion and
protection of human rights. Most of these provisions represent a univer-
sal awareness of what constitutes fundamental freedoms, and judicial
review or legislative action may enforce some of these protections. A
presumption that political rights and group rights deserve more atten-
tion than economic and social rights characterizes the nations' constitu-
tional protection of human rights. The "new rights" such as matters
pertaining to environmental issues are just beginning to attract the at-
tention of the international community. The following examples of con-
stitutional human rights protections should be considered when at-
tempting to deal with discrimination and inequality in post-apartheid
South Africa.
1. India
India is perhaps the most admired populous democracy as it created
and sustained a democratic constitution, and a Bill of Rights devoted to
the protection of human rights. Nevertheless, India consists of several
ethnic groups divided by cultural, linguistic, religious, and distinctive
class and caste barriers. The Indian Constitution guarantees equality of
all citizens, along with respect for the preservation of language, culture,
and choice of education. Article 46 of the constitution requires the In-
dian state to:
Promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker
sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of
exploitation.90
Rights under article 46, however, are not enforceable in any court of
law or tribunal even though the Indian Supreme Court can legally en-
89. See F. FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH; F. FANON, DYING COLONIAL-
ism (perceiving the subject of European colonialism and racism as something not en-
tirely divorced from "white supremacist" ideology). See also I. \VALLE3RSTEIN, AFRICA:
TiE PoLrTcs OF INDEPENDENCE (concerning the same proposition). It must be pointed
out that the Civil War was not a war about the freedom of the slaves. It was an eco-
nomic war between the North and South which necessarily involved the freeing of the
slaves to work in the new industries of the North. It was not until the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 that blacks started to enjoy some significant rights and privi-
leges. J. GEsCHWENDER, CTASS, RACE AND WORKER INSURGENCY 13 (1977).
90. INDIA CONST. art. 46.
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force the Bill of Rights."' In State of Madras v. Champakan,9" the
Indian Supreme Court held that where a nonjusticiable directive prin-
ciple of the constitution is in conflict with a justiciable fundamental
right, the fundamental right takes preference over the constitutional
directive.9" This dichotomy, coupled with the existing acrimony of the
Indian upper and middle classes against the government's affirmative
action program, has caused some serious conflicts among the various
groups. 4
In addition to the constitutional protection of the rights of the indi-
gent Indian masses, the government enacted the Protection of Civil
Rights Act in 1955, which sought "to prescribe punishment for preach-
ing and practice of 'untouchability', for the enforcement of any disabil-
ity arising therefrom and for matters connected therewith. ' '95 Thus, any
discrimination on the ground of "untouchability" would constitute an
offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of not less than one
month and not more than six months.98 This clearly shows the Indian
government's determination to eradicate discrimination in the Indian
society.
2. Nigeria
Nigeria, with a population of 150 million and over 250 different eth-
nic groups,97 has a federal constitution which although based on the
American federal tradition, is similar to the Indian Constitution. Chap-
ter IV of the constitution provides an elaborate list of fundamental
rights and group rights.98 This feature of the constitution has prompted
some American human rights academics to claim that the Nigerian
Constitution provides the best method of protecting human rights in
the international community.99
Article 42 of the constitution allows any person alleging violation of
a guaranteed constitutional right to apply to the High Court for re-
91. INDIA CONST. at arts. 32, 37.
92. State of Madras v. Champakan, 1951 S.C.R. 525.
93. 6 MOD. LEGAL SYS. CYCLOPEDIA 390.43 (1990).
94. See Fin. Times, May 21, 1991, at 4 (discussing how this long bitterness was
recently inflamed by former Prime Minister V.P. Singh's decision to reserve 27 percent
of government posts for the "backward classes" which represents about one fifth of a
total of 840 million people).
95. The Protection of Civil Rights Act, preamble (A.I.R. 1955).
96. Id. at § 4.
97. 6 MOD. LEGAL SYS. CYCLOPEDIA 390.10 (1990).
98. Id. at 390.24, 390.35, 390.52.
99. BLAUSTEIN, supra note 41, at 783.
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lief.100 The weakness of the Nigerian Constitution is that it puts indi-
vidual rights above group rights. The assumption that an individual
represents a group can be misleading when a group wants to enforce its
right collectively as a group independently of the individuals which
make it.
The Nigerian Constitution presents well-defined principles, including
the separation of powers. Apart from the doctrine of judicial review
provided by the Nigerian Constitution,01 the federal supremacy clause
also serves to control the actions of local governments and the abuse of
human rights. In Adesanya v. President of The Federal Republic of
Nigeria, °2 the Chief Justice of Nigeria, Fatayi Williams, clearly stated
that any law inconsistent with the Nigerian federal constitution is inva-
lid.10 3 The same view was stressed in Okogi v. Attorney General of
Lagos,10 4 where the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a Lagos
State circular letter which purported to ban private education in the
Lagos State. 0 5 The prohibition on private education arose from the ar-
gument that Lagos State provides equal education opportunities in pub-
lic schools built by the state in accordance with the federal "directive"
contained in section 18 of the federal constitution.0 6 The Nigerian
Court of Appeals held that such a directive reflects state policy and has
to comply with fundamental rights. 0 7 In the event of transgression
upon the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the federal constitution,
the right of a private citizen would prevail over that of the public at
large.108 Okogi strengthened the belief that equal education opportuni-
ties in public schools do not necessarily guarantee the quality of educa-
tion available in private schools. 0 9 This provides a good example for
those who would advocate a compulsory public school system of educa-
tion for a post-apartheid South Africa. Nigeria does not have legisla-
tion which prohibits discrimination, and the emphasis on individualism
seems to be a negation of the African communal way of life and an
open invitation for corruption and political adventurism.
100. 6 MOD. LEGAL SYS. CYCLOPEDIA 390.37 (1990).
101. Id. at 390.37.
102. Adesanya v. President of The Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1981 2 N.C.L.R.
358.
103. Id. at 357.
104. Okogi v. Attorney Gen. of Lagos, 1981 2 N.C.L.R. 337, 352-53.
105. Id. at 352.
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3. Malaysia
Malaysia is another developing country which has a strong federal
constitution designed along the lines of group rights. Although the Chi-
nese are the dominant merchant class, the Malay Constitution provides
special educational and economic opportunities for the Malay minor-
ity. 1 ' A prohibition on any challenge of its indispensability shows the
importance of this affirmative action clause."' This places the Chinese
in a difficult position to contest what looks like a permanent endorse-
ment of affirmative action.
4. Fiji
Fiji is another example of the proposition that there can be no equal-
ity within inequality. When Fiji was due to become independent, there
were justifiable fears that the introduction of one man, one vote could
lead to the domination of the native population by the Indian majority
and other ethnic minorities like the Chinese and whites who control the
Fijian economy." 2 In the negotiations about the constitutional future of
Fiji, representatives of the various ethnic groups resolved to adopt a
"group rights" type of constitution under which each group was guar-
anteed a delegate in the house of representatives." 3 Section 16 of the
1990 Constitution prohibits discrimination on the grounds of color,
race, or national origin, but the constitution is silent on the issue of
positive discrimination in favor of the historically disadvantaged Fijian
natives." 4 The Fijian experience certainly is not good for South Africa,
and even Judge Rooney, who seemingly thought it could be useful for
South Africans, ultimately, concluded that:
Democracy to be viable requires popular consensus on the acceptability of the
system itself. It is easier to achieve such a consensus in a society which is not
deeply riven by ethnic, religious, linguistic, or racial divisions. Experiments at-
tempting to confine such differences within one democracy have seldom suc-
ceeded. The one great and enduring exception is the biggest democracy in the
world, India, which despite difficulties in certain areas has survived as a free
society against all expectations. 1 8
110. FED. CONST. pt. XII, art. 153 § 2 (Malaysia).
111. BLAUSTEIN, supra note 41, at 769-70. See T. SUFFIAN, H. LEE & F.
TRINIDADE, THE CONSTITUTION OF MALAYSIA (1979) (discussing the protections pro-
vided for the Malays in the Malaysian Constitution).
112. Rooney, Group Protection - The Fijian Experience, 30 CODICILLUS 15, 16
(1989) [hereinafter Rooney].
113. Id.
114. FIJI CONST. § 16.
115. Rooney, supra note 112, at 22-3.
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5. Canada
In Canada, the federation is primarily a union of the economically
powerful Anglophones who are the majority, and the Francophones
who are specially favored as a minority group. 116 This preferential
treatment is guaranteed by the new Canadian Constitution (1982)
which treats the French-speaking province of Quebec as a special entity
within the federation.117 The Indian aboriginal minority has not re-
ceived similar treatment from the Canadian government or the consti-
tution. 18 Section 15 of the 1982 constitution does, however, guarantee
equality to all Canadians including the Indians, and further approves of
any:
programme or activity that has as its objective the amelioration of conditions of
disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that arc disadvantaged be-
cause of race, national, or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.110
The affirmative action is generally designed for all minorities or
groups and does not single out the Indians or black Canadians as a
special group, although the constitution favors the Francophones as a
particularly deserving group. 120 The French-speaking Canadians do not
wish at all to become assimilated to the Canadian cultural and political
mainstream. 21 They prefer to remain distinctively French even though
they are a minority in Canada. 22 It would be unfortunate if a future
South African Constitution were to treat white South Africans as a
"special group" and thus accord them a special constitutional status.
This would result in the indirect promotion of white supremacy by a
constitution which is supposed to be the antithesis of racism and group
domination.
6. Belgium
The current Canadian ethnic tensions bear a semblance to the Bel-
gian situation involving the Flemish- and French-speaking Belgians.1 23
116. T. KooPbmNs, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION oF EQUAuTY 65-6 (1975)[here-
inafter KooPMANs].
117. CAN. CONST. Pt. 1, § 23 (1982). Quebec is exempted from the section's re-
quirement that children of the language minority be taught in their primary language.
Id.
118. Id. Indians receive an exemption from the section's requirements. Id.
119. CAN. CONST. pt. 1, § 15 (1982).
120. CAN. CONST. pt. 2, § 35 (1982).
121. KooPimNs, supra note 116, at 65.
122. Id. at 243.
123. Id.
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The Belgian Constitution of 1971 was designed to promote group rights
on the basis of equality and recognition of cultural and linguistic diver-
sities. 124 Equality in Belgium operates on the assumption that all the
social groups are on the same social level; hence the constitution does
not make a provision for positive discrimination in favor of any of the
groups.'25 The old Belgiam Constitution was meant to create a unitary
identity, but campaigns by the Flemish-speaking section of the commu-
nity forced the government to amend the constitution in such a way
that Belgium could pursue a policy of cultural pluralism and "group
rights" identity. 126
This clearly indicates that a unitary system in South Africa may
create some similar problems, but it does not mean to say that the
"group rights" notion is the best solution for a post-apartheid system.
The countries discussed so far do not have serious racial problems, and
the promotion of group rights was intended to achieve justice and
equality among the various social groups. In South Africa, however,
group rights are at present a euphemism for racial segregation and
white domination.
7. Germany
Countries which have a history of racial discrimination like Ger-
many, Britain, and the United States, have by and large gone beyond
constitutional provisions to control the menace of racism and to prevent
racial discrimination. 27 Germany's constitution guarantees equality for
all German citizens, and gives the Federal Constitutional Court unlim-
ited powers to review all matters relating to the interpretation of
rights.' 28 Although the constitution does not provide for preferential
treatment of any German minority, each individual citizen has direct
access to the Federal Constitutional Court to enforce his or her consti-
tutional rights.'29 The constitution does not consider racism as deserv-
ing of special legal protection separately from the general equality pro-
visions contained in article 3. The German government's approach to
124. BELG. CONST. art. 59.
125. BELG. CONST. art. 59.
126. BLAUSTEIN, supra note 41, at 766-69.
127. See R. WINTER, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE ANSWER TO DISCRIMINATION? 1-
40 (1975); Marshall, Enforcing Equality: Two Statutory Attempts in 3 EQUALITY AND
FREEDOM 933-39 (F. Dorsey ed. 1977)(discussing how to make the Civil Rights and
Race Relations Acts more effective in implementation and enforcement).
128. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 93(4)(a) (W. Ger.) (stating that all constitutionality
complaints shall be heard by the Federal Constitutional Court).
129. Id.
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the need for a distinct statutory protection for the historically op-
pressed and disadvantaged groups denotes that constitutional provisions
alone are not satisfactory means for the protection of fundamental free-
doms and individual rights.
8. Great Britain
The British, believed to be the earliest Europeans to introduce and
institutionalize racism in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, are also
ironically the first Europeans to create a statute which deals distinc-
tively with protection against racial discrimination.1 30 The typical expe-
rience of many blacks in Britain is manifested in the following
statement:
When I left Jamaica for England I did respect the Englishmen; and I did expect
these people to treat me with respect as how we treat them in Jamaica. But I
found that we West Indian Negroes are looked upon as inferior human beings by
the English natives. I found that even when my children go out to play with the
English children in the street, the English parents pull back their children to
come inside.131
The British Parliament passed the Race Relations Act of 1976 (1976
Act).132 The 1976 Act marked the first time that both overt and covert
racial discrimination were deemed illegal. According to section 1 of the
1976 Act, a person discriminates against another if:
(a)On racial grounds he treats that other person less favorably than he treats or
would treat other persons; or
(b)he applies to that other person a requirement or condition which he applies or
would apply equally to persons not of the same racial groups as that other but -
(i)which is such that the proportion of persons of the same racial group as that
other who can comply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of per-
sons not of that racial group who can comply with it; and
(ii)which is to the detriment of that other person because he cannot comply with
it.133
Section 3 of the 1976 Act defines a "racial group" as a group of
persons who are identified by reference to race, color, nationality, or
ethnic or national origin; and "racial grounds" as any reason which is
found in the above statute.1 34 Generally, the 1976 Act covered discrimi-
130. See Race Relations Act 1976, ch. 74 [hereinafter jointly cited as Race Rela-
tions Acts] (deriving from the 1965 and 1968 Race Relations Acts).
131. W. DANIEL, RACIAL DIsCRIMINATION iN ENGLAND 31 (1968) (noting that
blacks in Britain, including West Indians, Africans, Indians, and Pakistanis make up
over a million of the country's 55 million citizens).
132. Race Relations Act 1976, ch. 76.
133. Race Relations Act 1976 pt. I, § 1.
134. Race Relations Act 1976 at pt. I, § 3.
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nation in employment, housing, education, and situations when a per-
son is treated less favorably than others because of what he or she is
alleged to have done or said.135
The 1976 Act allows positive discrimination in employment,136 and
incitement to racial hatred is a criminal offence under the Public Order
Act of 1986.137 The 1976 Act empowered the Commission for Racial
Equality:
(a)to work toward the elimination of discrimination,
(b)to promote equality of opportunity, and good relations between persons of dif-
ferent racial groups generally, and
(c)to keep under review the working of the Act and, when they are so required
by the Secretary of State or otherwise think it necessary, to draw up and submit
to the Secretary of State proposals for amending it.1 38
Unlike whites in the United States, whites in Britain have not drasti-
cally resisted positive discrimination. The main criticism made against
the 1976 Act relates to its feeble process of enforcement. The Commis-
sion for Racial Equality is entrusted with the duty of investigating all
complaints about racial discrimination,' 39 and if convinced about the
substance and authenticity of the complaint, the Commission may try
to effect a conciliation before the case goes to a tribunal for settle-
ment.'40 The complainant has no direct access to a court or to the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights.' 14
9. The United States
Finally, in the United States, racial discrimination is still a contro-
versial issue particularly in the areas of education, housing, and em-
ployment.' 42 The pre-Civil War Constitution was quiet on the question
of slavery as a private right within state law and legal jurisdiction.14 3
135. Race Relations Act 1976 pt. I, § 2.
136. Race Relations Act 1976 pt. VI, § 38.
137. Public Order Act 1986, ch. 64, pt. III.
138. Race Relations Act 1976, ch. 76, at pt. VII, § 43.
139. Race Relations Act 1976, ch 76, at pt. VII, § 48.
140. See Marshall, Enforcing Equality: Two Statutory Attempts, in 3 EQUALITY
AND FREEDOM 933 (1977) (discussing the enforcement of the Race Relations Acts, and
the powers of the Commission for Racial Equality).
141. Id.
142. See generally D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 363-661 (1986)
(providing a history of American civil rights cases and laws in the areas of housing,
education, and employment) [hereinafter Bell].
143. Id. at 2-30. See e.g. 0. HANDLIN, RACE AND NATIONALITY ON AMERICAN
LIFE (1957); J. BOGGS, RACISM AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE (1970); R. WINTER, AF-
FIRMATIVE ACTION: THE ANSWER TO DISCRIMINATION? (1975) (providing varied de-
scriptions of the protracted struggle for racial equality in the United States).
[VOL. 7:45
SOUTH AFRICAN BILL OF RIGHTS
An analogy can be made between the apartheid policy in South Africa
and the prevalent attitude in southern American states prior to the en-
actment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Civil Rights Act).1 44 Like the
American Civil War, the Anglo-Boer War (1899) between the English
and the Afrikaners in South Africa was also to some extent fought over
domination and control of the indigenous black population.
After a series of bitter campaigns by black Americans for equality
and an end to racial discrimination, Congress finally responded by en-
acting the Civil Rights Act.14" The Civil Rights Act intended to
strengthen and enforce the civil rights provisions contained in the thir-
teenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments of the Constitution." 6
This illustrates the frailty of non-self executing enforcement clauses
contained in the Bill of Rights which depend upon appropriate legisla-
tion for enforcement.
Prior to the Civil Rights Act, the three constitutional amendments,
which some academicians claim were self-executing, 1 7 caused a great
deal of anxiety on the part of those seeking protection from the courts.
The thirteenth amendment abolished slavery,"18 while the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments guaranteed to blacks equality and the right
to vote respectively."49 In Plessy v. Ferguson,'" the doctrine of "sepa-
rate but equal," which called for separate facilities for blacks and
whites was endorsed by the Supreme Court, 15' even though this meant
a perpetration of separate development on an equal level as it is in most
parts of South Africa today. A sense of justice later prevailed when the
Supreme Court overruled Plessy in Brown v. Board of Education.5 2
Brown concerned the admission of a black student in a predominantly
white college. The Court held that a state law which required racially
segregated public schools violated the equal protection clause of the
federal constitution, because "separate educational facilities are inher-
ently unequal."' 53 In Shelly v. Kraemer,154 the Court extended the
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (1988).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seg. (1988).
146. Civil Rights Act of 1964, preamble, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq (1988)).
147. See KoOPMANS, supra note 116, at 14 (stating that the Civil War amend-
ments were self-executing and were subject to judicial enforcement). Although self-
executing, each amendment grants Congress the power to implement and enforce ap-
propriate legislation. Id.
148. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
149. U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CON sT. amend. XV, § 1.
150. 163 U.S. 533 (1896).
151. Id.
152. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
153. Id. at 495.
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right of ownership of real property to blacks, where the property in
question was subject to a restrictive covenant making it available only
to whites. 155
These gains were not realized without fights and the loss of life of
civil rights leaders and activists, who looked upon the court for assis-
tance. This situation is well articulated by Professor Nathan Glazer
when he argues that "we should not underestimate the significance of
the individual aspect of these rights. Each case goes into the individ-
ual's account of discrimination, the damage to the individual."1 5
Glazer concludes that in 1964 it was expected "that these rights would
become effective because individuals would claim them, and because
they would now be treated as individuals, without distinctions of color
or national origin.' ' 57
By the 1970s Congress had introduced the quota system, which was
an admission that positive action could achieve true advancement of
group rights in a better manner. Congress designed the system to com-
pel employers, college authorities, government agencies, and other simi-
lar institutions, known to have the tendency to discriminate against
blacks and other minorities, to reserve certain positions for minorities
as groups rather than individuals.1 58 Many colleges and employers in
the United States have responded positively to this federal requirement.
Thus, some predominately white American universities reserve a cer-
tain number of places in their various departments for minorities. This,
however, has generated a lot of resentment and anger as some whites
claim that minorities are promoted at the expense of white progress.
The attitudes of some whites toward affirmative action is expressed by
Professor Bell as follows:
Conceding that blacks have been harmed by slavery, or segregation, or discrimi-
nation, which groups of whites should pay the price or suffer the disadvantage
that may be incurred in implementing a policy nominally directed at rectifying
that harm?"1 9
In the test case Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,10 a white
applicant who had been twice refused admission to study medicine at
154. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
155. See id. (explaining that restrictive covenants were used by white property
owners to exclude blacks, Jews, and other minorities from purchasing real estates in the
predominantly white neighborhoods).
156. N. GLAZER, ETHNIC DILEMMAS 1964-1982 260 (1983).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 261.
159. D. BELL, supra note 142, at 145.
160. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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the University of California Medical School challenged the system of
affirmative action.161 The medical school denied admission to the stu-
dent not because of his inability, but because of the quota system which
required the university to consider a minority student first.162 The med-
ical school had reserved sixteen percent of its places for minority stu-
dents.163 The student contended that the special admission program,
which gave preference to minorities like blacks, Asians, Latin-Ameri-
cans, and others,"" violated his rights under the fourteenth amendment
and under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, pertaining to nondiscrimi-
nation in federally assisted programs.16 5
The Supreme Court, which ruled in Bakke's favor, rationalized its
decision by pointing out that the university authorities had, among
other things, failed to produce evidence which would persuade the
Court that the quota system did not harm white students who did not
contribute to, or directly benefit from, discriminatory practices. 66 The
black community saw the decision as a legitimization of the reverse
discrimination claim and an attempt to undermine affirmative action.
Since Bakke, it is fair to say that the Supreme Court, especially during
President Reagan's administration, has been unwilling to promote af-
firmative action and to protect victims of discriminatory practices.16 7 In
spite of all these problems, Congress and the courts have played an
integral role in the improvement of race relations in the United States,
and the black community has benefitted from affirmative action. 6 8
The United States, as a nation, is meant to be a federation of indi-
vidual states (not ethnic groups) in which each and every American
citizen is supposed to have the opportunity to achieve his or her individ-
ual objectives. This "melting pot" theory depicts a unity of individual
and patriotic American achievers, rather than a symbol of group spirit
and national self-determination. In fact, the whole idea behind this
methodology is to de-emphasize the existence of group or ethnic con-
flicts. The emphasis on individual success is intended to psychologically
suppress ethnic or racial tensions on the part of the disadvantaged and
161. Id.
162. Id. at 276.
163. Id. at 279.
164. Id. at 274.
165. Id. at 278.
166. Id. at 319-20.
167. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1988) (showing recent Supreme Court deci-
sions addressing affirmative action and racial discrimination in employment).
168. Detroit Free Press, Jan. 31, 1990, at 7A.
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impoverished minorities, and to instill the concept that everyone can
achieve success as an individual in American society.
The black South African majority is, however, more concerned about
human rights in a broader political and economic sense than the black
American minority. Black South Africans are in a struggle for indepen-
dence as well as civil rights. They refuse to assimilate into foreign cul-
tures and would rather co-exist than be seen as part of the whole.
Moreover, the blacks in America lack the cultural identity and linguis-
tic bond which are so vital for the sustenance and maintenance of a
political struggle. As one writer puts it:
It is not unlikely that the Quebecois have no intention of professing their loyalty
to Canada, because the option in favor of separation is a more realistic perspec-
tive for them than the American Negroes .... They don't share only a common
language and a disfavored social position but also... a way of life which distin-
guishes them from their English speaking compatriots. In short they have been
able to maintain a culture of their own. The American blacks on the contrary
have no cultural identity to the same extent: They were largely sharing norma-
tive opinions and attitudes of the white population.6 9
III. PROPOSALS FOR A SOUTH AFRICAN BILL OF
RIGHTS
Faced with the conflict between group rights and individual rights,
basic rights and essential rights, and federalism and unitary govern-
ment, the enormity of the task confronting parties working to craft a
new South African Bill of Rights becomes apparent. Both the govern-
ment's Law Commission and the ANC have developed draft proposals
for a new South African Bill of Rights. The highlights, strengths and
weaknesses of each are contained below, in addition to recommenda-
tions for this all-important document.
A. THE GOVERNMENT'S LAW COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL
The present South African apartheid policy, whether it chooses to
appear in the costume of "Separate Development," to change to a "Tri-
cameral" three piece suit or to a casual "Own Affairs" uniform, 170 is
still a legalized and institutionalized oppressive system based on the
169. KOOPMANS, supra note 116, at 243-66.
170. See Promotion of Black Self Government Act of 1959, as amended (allowing
for group separate development). See also W. HOSTEN, A. EDWARDS, C. NATHAN &
F. BOSMAN, INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 664 (1977)
(providing an in-depth analysis of the Black Self Government Act of 1959). The Act
resulted in the creation of the "Bantu Homelands" of Transkei, Ciskei, KwaZulu,
Venda, Bophuthatswana, Qwaqwa, KwaNdebele, Lebowa, Gazankulu, and Kwa-
Ngwane. Id. Subsequently, four of these homelands-Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthat-
swana, and Venda-were granted independence by South Africa. Id. However, no
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racial domination of the white minority upon the black majority. In
these circumstances, the group concept means or implies group divi-
sions, not for the purpose of promoting justice and equality, but for
protecting and maintaining white privileges at the expense of black ad-
vancement. The government's willingness to negotiate a new constitu-
tional dispensation with the ANC and other recognized organizations,
and to establish a Bill of Rights, however, indicates the government's
realization that the Homeland Policy and the Tricameral system have
failed to prove that the group rights policy of separate development or
representation can work in South Africa.
The working paper of the South African Law Commission on group
and human rights and its draft Bill of Rights published in April
198911 have to be studied and analyzed in the context of what group
rights really mean in international and constitutional law. Mr. M. A.
Pathudi is right in pointing out that:
[rieference to the so-called group rights concept on the bill will certainly carry
with it obscure and somewhat far-reaching implications which boldly speaking
are seen as propagating and fostering the philosophy of separate development in
its true but disguised form, the very mischief which the bill allegedly desired and
seeks to cure.17 2
If black South Africans view the document solely from an emotional
and subjective posture, they may miss an opportunity to utilize it for
their own benefit and for the promotion of peace and democracy in a
united nonracial South Africa. Most importantly, blacks should toler-
ate and respect the views of white opposition - for that is what negoti-
ation for peace is really about.
The South African Law Commission should be commended for un-
dertaking such a difficult task, especially with the current wave of
white right-wing terrorism in the country. The Commission's document
is an interesting comprehensible report which certainly warrants an
honest appraisal. The bill reflects the government's intention to elimi-
nate institutionalized racism. The bill, however, does not make it clear
what the government considers as 'fundamental rights' and how it pro-
poses to achieve equality and a nonracial democracy in South Africa.
171. See The South African Law Commission Bill of Rights, 21 COLUI. Hu.
RTs. L. REV. 241 & n.1 (1989) [hereinafter South African Bill of Rights] (noting that
the commission which was made up of Afrikaner legal academics, members of the judi-
ciary, and political scientists). The commission is a product of the South Africa Law
Commission Act 19 of 1973. Id.
172. Address by M.G. Pathudi, reprinted in 30 CODICILLUs 78 (1989).
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Part A of this cumbersome document contains an excessive list of
what appears to be a random selection of 'fundamental rights'.173 The
introduction to part A assures that these are "fundamental rights to
which every person in the Republic of South Africa shall be enti-
tled. . . . "14 This implies that all South Africans regardless of race,
color, sex or creed are entitled to those rights. The confusion in the
selection of the list of fundamental human rights, stems from the fact
that the Commission seriously ignored that human rights are not the
same; that each one of them serves a specific function for a particular
reason. Fundamental rights are different from other rights such as civil
liberties and some economic rights.175 The fact that the Commission
does not explain the rationale or methodology which was used to
achieve the list further compounds the problem. This document looks
more like a declaration of human rights than an enumeration of funda-
mental rights.
In the area of natural rights or fundamental freedoms, the list con-
tains, inter alia, the right to life,' 7 1 the right to property, 77 the right to
freedom of association, 78 and the right to equality and due process of
law. 7 9 Regarding political and civil rights, the list includes the right to
education, 180 the right to vote, 8' and the right to freedom of movement
and residence. 82 These are generally considered individual rights. The
Commission did not pay much attention to economic and social rights,
although article 18 guarantees the right to form trade unions.11s
The most striking thing about the Commission is its apparent sensi-
tivity to group rights. The Commission uses the notion of human rights,
which conforms to the international standard, even though some may
disagree about the need to protect these group rights. There is, how-
ever, an overemphasis on the protection of cultural heritage and lan-
guages in articles 21 and 22 which is unnecessary duplication. Leaving
that aside, every sensible South African agrees that a constitutional
document should preserve the right of each and every group to worship
173. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171, at pt. A, arts. 1-29.
174. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171, at pt. A, preamble.
175. See generally D. OWEN, HUMAN RIGHTS (1978) (discussing the categoriza-
tion of human rights).
176. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171, at art. 1.
177. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171, at art. 14.
178. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171, at art. 16.
179. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171, at art. 2.
180. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171, at art. 9.
181. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171, at art. 20.
182. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171 at art. 12.
183. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171 at art. 18.
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and to retain its own culture and language. But the inclusion of article
17 has made many people apprehensive. It guarantees:
The right of every person or group to disassociate himself or itself from other
individuals or groups: Provided that if such disassociation constitutes discrimina-
tion on the ground of race, color, religion, language or culture, no public or state
funds shall be granted directly or indirectly to promote the interests of the person
who or group which so discriminates.'" 4
This right is already provided for under article 16 relating to free-
dom of association because the right to associate also entails the right
to disassociate. Common sense dictates that individuals will always feel
more comfortable when they are with their own people or social group,
and no law is necessary to enforce or change that. The law, however,
should equally protect those who refuse to be enslaved by tradition or
chauvinism from within their own group. Article 17 is also dangerous
in the sense that it may encourage racial separatism or even secession
from a future South African federation as currently is the danger in
Canada. The Commission is naive if it assumes that a government's
refusal to provide some public or state funds is an effective way of dis-
couraging the formation of extremist organizations from either the
right or left sides of the political spectrum. Most organizations of that
nature are self-supportive and self-efficient. Mr. Mathole Motshekga
makes a good point when he concludes that:
Article 22 may even encourage the formation of cultural groups (similar to In-
katha) which could take advantage of Articles 17 and 18 to form political parties
along racial lines. In short, recognition of the right of groups to exist in any form
and their right to have voting and veto powers could be misused to preserve
apartheid and prevent South Africa from becoming a truly nonracial and demo-
cratic society.'85
Many blacks have feared the inclusion of a white minority "veto
power" in the document. There does not appear, however, to be such a
provision of this nature in the Commission's draft. On the other hand,
the lack of a clear presentation of the government's thesis creates im-
probabilities and implausabilities which are enough to make the ANC
and other groups suspect government interference with the due process
of law. In addition, the failure to clearly explain whether the group
rights provisions under articles 17, 18 and 22 also apply to the home-
land authorities add to that suspicion. Furthermore, article 22 states
that the South African Supreme Court, which will be entrusted with
184. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171 at art. 17.
185. Motshekga, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights-Its Impor-
tance to Human Rights Thinking in South Africa, 30 CODICILLUS 31, 48 (1989).
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the power to enforce all human rights related complaints, should al-
ways "have regard to the interests of other individuals or groups of
individuals" in adjudicating claims of discrimination. 8 ' These issues
have caused observers to view the government proposals in a highly
sensitive and critical light. This might explain why Mothshekga com-
plained about "group veto power"'187 and Thabo Mbeki declared that
the ANC "can't accept a system which seems to give the right to vote
to every person and then establishes institutions which make that ca-
pacity ineffectual."' 188
In the strict legal sense, one cannot talk about a claim of minority
veto power when there is neither direct nor circumstantial evidence of
it in the document. This document is not a constitutional proposal; it is
an envisaged Bill of Rights which can become an integral part of a
future constitution or stand on its own feet. The government will very
likely introduce a "minority veto power" clause during the actual con-
stitutional discussions. If that occurs, the opposition will have a valid
reason to reject any constitutional leverage that may be used as a dis-
guise to preserve white privileges and domination. The fact that there
are good reasons to question the true commitment of the government to
equality does not make its declaration of intent redundant or invalid.
Further, treating a Bill of Rights as if it were a political manifesto or
constitutional proposition is bound to create some confusion or at least
a crescendo of innuendos. The document clearly points out that:
[t]he so called constitutional question in South Africa was not part of the com-
mission's mandate, however this question cannot be solved without a solution to
the problems concerning individual rights, and the cultural, religious, and lin-
guistic values."'
The Commission should also receive credit for the introduction of
positive discrimination'"0 in recognition of the long history of political
and economic exploitation of black people. That exploitation has re-
duced them to a position of political powerlessness and economic vul-
nerability. Their plight makes blacks economically dependent even
when they are politically independent. The most significant pronounce-
ment in this draft Bill of Rights is the guarantee of the right to vote for
every South African over the age of eighteen years old, which implies
186. See South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171, at art. 22 (stating the right
against discrimination).
187. Mothshekga, supra note 185, at 48.
188. Tudor, South Africa's ANC Wants Two-house Parliament Free of Race,
Reuters Library Report, Sept. 7, 1991.
189. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171, at para. 13.70.
190. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171, at art. 2.
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the acceptance of majority rule on the principle of one man one vote,
based on the doctrine of universal suffrage.""1 Regarding the right of
enforcement, the draft Bill of Rights entitles each individual or group
to directly approach the South African Supreme Court concerning a
complaint or request for judicial review.19 2
One weakness in the document is that although it guarantees positive
discrimination on a "temporary basis,"'9 3 it does not offer any guide-
lines on the definition or scope of "temporary basis." Another weakness
present in the document is the lack of a systematic and clear approach
to identify fundamental rights. For instance, the list includes such ob-
scure rights like the right to a good name and reputation,"', the right to
spiritual and physical integrity,19 5 the right to freely carry out scientific
research and to practice art, 96 and the right to freely, and on equal
footing, engage in economic intercourse, which shall include the capac-
ity to establish and maintain commercial undertakings, to produce
property and means of production, to offer services against remunera-
tion, and to make a profit.19 7
The inclusion of private law rights and commercial law rights in the
list is unfortunate and misleading. Professor J. E. Devinish remarks
that:
[t]he report and the draft bill of rights do have certain patent limitations which
have their origin in their authorship and legitimacy. They are essentially the
product of the research of white judges and academics involved in the operation
of the existing status quo... the most serious deficit is that they virtually ignore
the great problem of poverty and the startling discrepancy between an affluent
ruling white oligarchy and a poor and oppressed black majority.'
Perhaps it might have been this desire to maintain the status quo and
the determination not to deal with economic and social rights which
inadvertently forced the Commission to claim as fundamental rights,
some rights which are rooted in private law.
191. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171, at art. 20.
192. South African Bill of Rights. supra note 171, at art. 31.
193. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171, at art. 2.
194. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171, at art. 3.
195. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171, at art. 4.
196. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171, at art. 9.
197. South African Bill of Rights, supra note 171, at art. 14.
198. Devenish, Democratic Power Sharing, the Ultimate Guarantee of Human
Rights 30 CODICILLUs 76 (1989).
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B. THE ANC's FREEDOM CHARTER AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUIDELINES FOR A DEMOCRATIC AND NON-RACIAL SOUTH AFRICA
Concerning the ANC's position on the issue of protection of funda-
mental rights and promotion of equality in South Africa, the Freedom
Charter (Charter) 9' and Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic
South Africa (Guidelines)2 00 represent a new light in the dark tunnel of
South African politics and economic reforms. The Guidelines, which
represent a short summary of the Charter and the views of the ANC
on the constitutional structure of a post-apartheid democracy, are in-
tended to promote an honest debate. Therefore, the Guidelines do not
constitute any final ANC policy or thesis pertaining to the actual con-
stitutional arrangement and Bill of Rights. The ANC accepts these
Guidelines as corrigible and that the final constitutional outcome
should be a synthesis which reflects both sides of the coin.
The Charter basically states the ANC's manifesto, which needs to be
updated or amended to reflect the current social and economic realities.
These realities concern the obstacles encountered in the enforcement of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights201 on both international and national levels. A future ANC gov-
ernment can put itself in a very embarrassing situation by making
guarantees which cannot be fulfilled. The ANC, like the Commission,
does not define or give any indication about what it actually means by
fundamental human rights. In its endorsement of affirmative action,
which is certainly a good idea, it has equally failed to state whether
positive discrimination will be on a temporary or permanent basis. This
is a serious omission when considering the experiences of India, Britain,
and the United States on the issue of a perpetual affirmative action
program. The Guidelines further make provisions for a mixed economy,
a land reform program, a charter of workers' rights, and equal rights
for women.202
The Guidelines therefore, provide protection for both individual and
group rights in the universal sense. The Guidelines, however, mainly
emphasize group rights in the economic and social sphere, which in
view of the obvious social dichotomy between the haves and have nots
is something desirable. Dr. Zola Skweyiya illustrates this idea in his
199. See Note, Freedom Charter, 21 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 249 n.1 (1989)
[hereinafter Note, Freedom Charter] (noting that the Congress of the People at
Kliptown adopted the Freedom Charter in 1955).
200. Note, Constitutional Guidelines, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 235 (1989).
201. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
61, at 49-52.
202. Note, supra note 200, at 237-38.
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discussion of land reform in South Africa. He states that "[tihe main
objective of this proposal is to redress the economic and social inequali-
ties of the agricultural population and to ameliorate the miserable con-
ditions of the black rural masses. 203 Dr. Skweyiya concludes that:
a well conceived post-apartheid land reform policy should guard against the de-
struction of the commercial agricultural sector, considering its major role as the
national food supplier and as a significant contributor to the country's national
foreign currency reserves. 2°0
Dr. Albie Sachs vindicates the ANC's failure regarding identification
of fundamental rights by saying that:
Whatever approach is adopted, the commitment to the classic first generation
rights (natural rights) must be total and unequivocal. The inclusion of social and
economic rights should be seen as additional to, and in no way diminishing of,
unconditional respect for fundamental civil and political rights. The Bill of
Rights should be unambiguous on this point. 05
To help understand the situation, Dr. Sach could make some indication
about those social and economic rights which he thinks are worth con-
sidering as "additional" to the notion of fundamental freedoms. It is
precisely the tendency of overlooking or ignoring this crucial matter
which causes some problems for a developing society. On the sensitive
issue of national identity, the Guidelines provide that:
It shall be state policy to promote the growth of a single national identity and
loyalty binding on all South Africans. At the same time, the state shall recognize
the linguistic and cultural diversity of the people and provide facilities for free
linguistic and cultural development.
208
This commitment proves that although the ANC's constitutional
ideal model is one which is based on a unitary system of government, it
does appreciate the necessity of providing protection for group rights.
What is not a conviction, however, is whether group rights can be prop-
erly and effectively protected and promoted within the narrow confines
of a unitary state. Moreover, the Guidelines do not fully explain how
the Bill of Rights will be enforced except just to state that an "appro-
priate mechanism for their enforcement" will be provided. 207 Sachs
merely argues that "citizens should have the right of recourse to an
independent judiciary respected by the population at large and heeded
203. Skweyiya, Towards a Solution to the Land Question in Post Apartheid South
Africa: Problems and Models 21 COLU, . Hui. RTs. L. REv. 211, 220-21 (1989).
204. Id.
205. Sachs, A Bill of Rights for South Africa: Areas of Agreement, and Disagree-
ment, 21 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REV. 13, 24 (1989) [hereinafter Sachs].
206. See Note, supra note 200, at 237 (noting the policy on national identity).
207. See id. (discussing the Bill of Rights).
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by whatever government is in power at the time. '208 Neither the ANC
nor the commissioner mentions the idea of introducing a jury system in
South Africa or the establishment of a special constitutional court and/
or the enactment of a special statute(s) to deal directly with cases of
discrimination.
Pennell M. Maduna agrees that one of the recourses available to an
individual is judicial review,20 9 but he is unhappy about the inherent
conservatism of the judiciary, especially in members of the bench. In
support of his apprehension, he quotes from Professor John Dugard
who argues that "South African judges are drawn from one small sec-
tion of the population - the white group - and whether they support the
government or not, most have one basic premise in common - loyalty to
the status quo." 210
The Guidelines are a set of challenging and thought-provoking pro-
nouncements, but they might ask for too much. This is true regarding
the ANC's hypersensitivity concerning economic and social rights, as it
is completely unrealistic to guarantee peace and friendship, and other
non-fundamental social and economic rights like food, lower prices,
lower rents, and new suburbs. 211 It would be enough if the ANC would
just commit itself to a social security system covering employment,
housing, health, and education. The ANC's vision of a new South Af-
rica is one of universal principles of equal justice and opportunity for
all South Africans. The new society would be a social democracy in
which each and every person or persons would have an opportunity to
pursue an economic goal in a mixed economic system within the frame-
work of industrial democracy and free collective bargaining. Every
South African is entitled to criticize and to make a constructive contri-
bution to the advancement of democracy and equality. "The ANC
guidelines were not intended to resolve all of South Africa's
problems. . . . The ANC guidelines are not exhaustive. They are silent
on many topics. '"212
208. Sachs, supra note 205, at 19.
209. Maduna, Judicial Review and Protection of Human Rights Under a New
Constitutional Order in South Africa, 21 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REv. 73, 76 (1989).
210. Id. at 82.
211. See Note, Freedom Charter, supra note 199, at 250-51 (discussing the right
to work and the right to security).
212. Masemola, Rights and a Future South African Constitution: The Controver-
sial and the Non-Controversial, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. at 45, 47 (1989).
[VOL. 7:45
SOUTH AFRICAN BILL OF RIGHTS
CONCLUSION
A straw vote in South Africa today would prove that the overwhelm-
ing majority of all South Africans support a negotiated settlement.
While violence in the townships has threatened the solidarity of the
ANC,21 3 it deserves the support of the South African people for pio-
neering this negotiation process. The same praise goes to the National
Party and to those courageous members of the South African business
community and clerics who actually initiated the negotiations by creat-
ing an atmosphere in which both the ANC and the government could
sit together, as equals, to discuss the constitutional future of South
Africa.
It is apparent that both parties agree on some of the major issues
like majority rule, eradication of all apartheid legislation, protection of
group rights, and the promotion of equal rights and opportunities
through affirmative action, especially in the sphere of employment. In
addition, both parties realize and appreciate the importance of the pro-
motion of good industrial relations. To this end, the parties guarantee
the existence of free trade unions and collective bargaining. In the area
of education, a general consensus pertaining to the dismantling of the
"separate but equal" policy also prevails.
On the whole, a future constitutional assembly needs to overhaul and
update both the Commission's document and the ANC's Guidelines,
especially on the subject of identifying fundamental human rights. A
South African Bill of Rights should inter alia provide that:
(a) all the inherent fundamental rights including those social and economic
rights which are considered necessary on the grounds of social need and expedi-
ence be protected;
(b) all group rights should be protected save when they are sought for the pur-
poses of creating racial divisions and perpetration of the enjoyment of white priv-
ileges and domination;
(c) a jury system should be introduced in South Africa to assure fair trial and
administration of justice;
(d) an independent constitutional court and special legislation(s), in addition to
the Bill of Rights, should be introduced to deal specifically with issues of
discrimination;
(e) such envisaged legislation should, in addition to providing a civil remedy for
violation, also provide a criminal sanction for incitement of racial hatred or dis-
crimination on the grounds of race;
213. See Wren, Mandela in Conciliatory Mood. Agrees to Meet with Zulu Leader,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1990, at Al (discussing the opening of dialogue between
Mandela and Buthelezi to discuss the violence in black townships which has taken hun-
dreds of lives).
1991]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
(f) a post-apartheid constitution should make provision for the creation of a
"Common House" based on hereditary title or appointment for the purposes of
consultation in respect of all matters pertaining to group rights, and that any
legislation which directly affects the interests of any particular group, should
necessarily go through the same process of consultation; provided that there
should be equal representation in the "Common House" and that no group in
any of the other houses should be granted any special privilege or right of veto.
In conclusion, it is fair to state that the government's paper on the
proposed Bill of Rights does not seem to be a prescription for neo-
apartheid. On the other hand, it is too early to say that the government
proposal guarantees full equality. President de Klerk in his recent visit
to the United States reiterated that:
South Africa has embarked on a great journey. It is a journey towards full de-
mocracy at home and abroad, full participation in the family of nations. It is a
journey that I sincerely believe will bring the fruits of both justice and economic
well-being to every South African family.""
The ANC's Freedom Charter and Guidelines bring to all South
Africans a new dawn, even though some of the ANC's economic de-
mands are unrealistic. We should draw a lesson from the disastrous
collapse of the socialist planned economies in Eastern Europe and the
abandonment of socialism by its potent instructors and devoted advo-
cates. All parties should stop vacillating so, in the name of peace and
democracy, South Africa can move ahead to create a new nation that
will be a home for all its citizens regardless of race, color, ethnic origin,
gender or creed.
214. See Wren, Pretoria Offers Model for Future N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1990, at
A5 (noting that the South African government unveiled a synopsis of what it purports
to be its constitutional model for a future democratic South Africa). The report will
still have to be formally discussed and approved by Mr. de Klerk before it is ready to
be introduced at the negotiation table. Id. Initially it proposed a two chamber Parlia-
ment, a Bill of Rights and a National Dispute Resolution System. Id.
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